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WANT TO TERMINATE LIFE SUPPORT?
NOT IN NEW YORK:
TIME TO GIVE NEW YORKERS A CHOICE
Bernadette Tuthill*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years have passed since the New York State Court of
Appeals decided the case of In re O'Connor.' In O'Connor, the court
held that in order to withhold or remove life-sustaining treatment
from an incompetent patient, there must be "clear and convincing
proof that the patient had made a firm and settled commitment,"
while they were competent, to decline a particular type of medical
treatment under the specific circumstances the patient finds them-
selves. 2 The O'Connor standard is, for all practical purposes, im-
possible to satisfy. It is a standard that is fir higher than any other in
the United States.3 Under O'Connor, unless a person can predict the
exact medical condition they will be suffering from, and choose not
to have life sustaining treatment for that condition, there can be no
guarantee that their wishes will be respected.4  New York is one of
only two states with a clear and convincing standard that requires a
prior treatment, or refusal of treatment, decision of a specific treat-
. Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2010. I would like
to thank all of the professors at Touro Law for an incredible educational experience, espe-
cially Marianne Artusio who brought my attention to this particular legislation and was a
tremendous help when I was mired in my writing of this Comment. I would also like to
thank my family and friends for their encouragement in my law school endeavor, particularly
my husband, Scott Dein, without whose support this would have not been possible.
' 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
2 Id. at 608.
Anthony W. Austin, Medical Decisions and Children: How Much Voice Should Child-
ren Have in Their Medical Care?, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 143, 160 (citing O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d
at 614-15).
4 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613.
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ment in a particular situation.5 Thirty-five other states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have statutes regarding surrogate decision making;
many others have case law dealing with these issues that establish a
much more realistic standard than O'Connor does for New York.6
These other states have developed standards that more fairly
balance a patient's right to self-determination against a state's interest
in preserving life.7 These standards take into consideration technolo-
gical advances that allow people to be kept alive until all of their or-
gans fail. These standards also account for a layperson's increased
access to information that is easily comprehended, allowing for in-
formed decision-making. It is time to revisit the O'Connor decision,
which does not take any of these factors into consideration.
New York has had a bill languishing in either the Assembly
or the Senate since 1992, called the Family Heath Care Decision Act
("FHCDA"), which would resolve all of the issues created by
O'Connor. It is past time for New York to pass the FHCDA, as it is a
realistic standard that assures New York's citizens that their final ill-
ness will be handled in a way that preserves their values and dignity.
Part II of this Comment presents an in-depth look at the cir-
cumstances of Mrs. O'Connor, and the court's decision in her case.
Part III examines more recent lower court decisions in New York that
distinguished O'Connor. Part IV discusses issues related to surrogate
decision-making, and will show that these concerns are, largely, un-
Thdr~se Wiley Dancks & Matthew J. VanBeveren, 2005-2006 Survey ofNew York Law:
Health Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1247, 1278 (2007).
6 See AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON LAW & AGING, DEFAULT SURROGATE CONSENT
STATUTES (2008), www.abanet.org/aging/legislativeupdates/pdfs/FamconChart.pdf;
ABIGAIL PETERSEN, AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON LAW & AGING, SURVEY OF HEALTH CARE
DECISION-MAKING STANDARDS IN STATE LEGISLATION (2007), http://www.abanet.org/aging/
docs/StandardsforSurrogateDecisionMakingChart.pdf; see also Mark H. Alcott, Letter to the
Editor, Medical Decisions Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, §4, at 11; NYSBA Urges Legisla-
ture to Pass Family Health Care Decision Act, DAILY REC. (N.Y.), June 21, 2006, 2006
WLNR 24316490 [hereinafter NYSBA Urges Legislature].
See PETERSEN, supra, note 6. For example, Indiana states that an agent appointed to
make medical decisions "may be empowered to ask in the name of the principal for health
care to be withdrawn or withheld when it is not beneficial or when any benefit is outweighed
by the demands of the treatment and death may result," and a surrogate "shall act 'in good
faith and in the best interest of the individual incapable of consenting.' " Id. (citing IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-5-17(a), 16-36-1-5(d) (West 2009)). Alaska has a similar standard
which allows an agent or a surrogate to withhold or withdraw life support from a terminally
ill or permanently unconscious patient either based on the patient's expressed wishes or the
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warranted. Part V examines the current state of New York laws, and
a statute from New Jersey that is an excellent decision making model,
used to develop the FHCDA. Finally, in Part VI, the FHCDA will be
examined, as well as some possible reasons the New York bill has
not yet been passed.
II. THE O'CONNOR DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1988, the New York State Court of Appeals was presented
with O'Connor.8 Mrs. O'Connor, a mother of two adult daughters,
was a seventy-seven year old woman who suffered from a multitude
of medical problems.9 Mrs. O'Connor had a history of congestive
heart failure, a series of strokes resulting in brain damage, disabilities
that did not allow her to be able to care for herself, and was rendered
incompetent to make decisions for herself regarding her medical
care. 0 Those facts were all agreed upon; however, the Court of Ap-
peals diverged significantly from the lower courts in interpreting
these facts. It is these facts that play an important role in understand-
ing what is at stake in New York, and the injustice Mrs. O'Connor
received.
After a long dissertation on Mrs. O'Connor's prior medical
history, the majority stated that Mrs. O'Connor was alert and could
follow and respond to simple commands, but that she could not swal-
low, which led to the application for a nasogastric feeding tube."
This description makes light of Mrs. O'Connor's ailments and makes
it seem as though Mrs. O'Connor's daughters might have ulterior
motives in trying to have their mother's life support terminated.
On the contrary, the lower courts and the dissent paint a much
graver picture of Mrs. O'Connor's true condition and the suffering
she endured. According to the dissent:
Mrs. O'Connor . . . suffered a series of progressively
debilitating strokes that have left her bedridden, sub-
8 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607.
9 Id. at 608.
10 Id.
" Id. at 609.
2010] 677
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stantially paralyzed, and unable to care for herself ....
[She is] "severely demented" and . . . "profoundly in-
capacitated." She is neither comatose nor in a vegeta-
tive state, but she responds only sporadically to simple
questions or commands, and then frequently inappro-
priately. The doctors agree that the neurological dam-
age from the strokes is irreparable, and no hope exists
for significant improvement in her mental or physical
condition. 12
Additionally, her daughters testified that their mother never spoke to
or responded to either of them vocally, or by facial or hand move-
ments, even though they saw her daily.13 The Medical Center's phy-
sician clarified further that Mrs. O'Connor can "phonate[, but]
[t]hat's about it really," and that when asked to perform simple tasks
for doctors to evaluate her lungs or asked whether she was experienc-
ing pain, she would not respond, presumably from lack of compre-
hension.14
In addition to very different descriptions of Mrs. O'Connor's
health, the concurring and dissenting judges took issue with the
weight given to Mrs. O'Connor's statements. Mrs. O'Connor worked
in hospital administration for over twenty years.' 5 She had cared for
or watched several family members die of cancer.16 Mrs. O'Connor,
given her background, most likely understood the ramifications and
definition of what "artificial means" encompassed.' 7 She absolutely
had more knowledge as to what "artificial means" entailed than the
average layperson. This advanced knowledge and understanding
should have given any statements made by Mrs. O'Connor more
weight than those same statements made by the average layperson.
B. The Statements: Majority Opinion
A co-worker and friend of Mrs. O'Connor's testified that sev-
12 Id. at 621 (Simons, J., dissenting).
13 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 621.
14 Id. at 621-22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 Id. at 608 (majority opinion).
16 Id.
17 Id at 622 (Simons, J., dissenting).
678 [Vol. 26
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eral times over four years, Mrs. O'Connor stated that she "would
never want to be a burden on anyone and [she] would never want to
lose [her] dignity before [she] passed away."' 8 Mrs. O'Connor ex-
pressed that her religion informed her views and that using artificial
means to extend life was unnatural. 19 Mrs. O'Connor also felt it was
"monstrous" to keep people alive using artificial means if there was
no chance of improvement, and "that people who are suffering very
badly should be allowed to die."20
Mrs. O'Connor's daughter testified:
[H]er mother informed her on several occasions that if
she became ill and was unable to care for herself she
would not want her life to be sustained artificially ...
that she would not want to go on living if she could
not take care of herself and make her own decisions
... and would never want any sort of intervention any
sort of life support systems to maintain or prolong her
life.21
These statements were made by Mrs. O'Connor at various
times after helping several relatives through their final days of their
terminal illnesses, as well as when comforting others when loved
ones had passed.2 2 Her daughters and friend all agreed that Mrs.
O'Connor made statements like these to all of them at some point,
but that she had not specifically mentioned food or water medical as-
sistance, or if she would refuse these treatments if it would cause a
painful death.23 The majority goes to great lengths to point out that
Mrs. O'Connor never specifically mentioned artificial nutrition or
hydration,24 but with Mrs. O'Connor's extensive medical back-
ground, artificial life support would have included these forms of life
support.
The Court of Appeals found that these statements, even
though the statements were repeated over a long period, were made
18 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 610-11 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19 Id. at 611.
20 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 id
23 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 610-11.
24 Id. at 614-15.
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either casually-without "seriousness of purpose"-or in reaction to
an "unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another's unneces-
sarily prolonged death." 25  The majority declined to apply New
York's clear and convincing standard, which was established in a
previous case. Instead, the New York Court of Appeals created an
entirely new standard: that there has to be "clear and convincing
proof that the patient had made a firm and settled commitment, while
competent, to decline this type of medical assistance under circums-
tances such as these." 26
The court acknowledged that this requirement would penalize
those who do not make a living will, or other similar writing, and that
"repeated oral expressions of the patient" would be sufficient. 27 The
court then stated, to the contrary, that Mrs. O'Connor's statements
were of the nature "that older people frequently, almost invariably
make," and that her statements did not sufficiently show "a serious-
ness of purpose." 2 8 This seems to indicate that if an older person
makes statements regarding life support measures, their statements
will be dismissed as mere rhetoric. So, how then, would the repeated
oral expressions of an older person have any credibility?
The "clear and convincing standard" has been in existence
since 1981 in New York, and used in many other states as the stan-
dard for determining whether evidence is sufficient to terminate life
support. However, the New York State Court of Appeals not only
created a new, heightened clear and convincing standard, but the
court contradicts itself repeatedly in the decision as to what would be
sufficient to meet the heightened standard. The court states that oral
statements would be sufficient, but then states that most statements
made by older people are not sufficient because they are the types of
statements they "almost invariably make." 29 The court states that a
patient does not have to contemplate their "precise condition and a
particular treatment," but then states that a person has to have a
commitment to decline a particular type of medical assistance under
25 Id. at 614.
26 Id. at 608; see also Lisa Belkin, New York Rule Compounds Dilemma Over Life Sup-
port, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at Al (discussing that Judge Wachtler, in interviews, ad-
mitted that while writing the O'Connor decision, he thought he may have allowed his moth-
er's similar situation to influence his decision).
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specific circumstances.3 The court has, not only, made incongruous
statements, it has created an unrealistic, unattainable standard of
proof.
C. The Statements: Concurring and Dissenting
Opinions
The concurring and dissenting justices felt that the new stan-
dard would be impossible to meet, and that a workable standard or
rule must be instituted by the legislature or judiciary. 31 The concur-
ring justice stated:
Relief depends exclusively upon a showing of a
present subjective intent, based upon the patient's past
oral or written statements unequivocally expressing
her desire not to have artificial life support continued
under specific circumstances. Where the patient has
never expressed such thoughts or has not done so
clearly, artificial life support may simply not be with-
held or withdrawn. .. . Thus, even where the incom-
petent patient is completely and irreversibly comatose
and vegetative or, although not comatose or vegeta-
tive, in a terminal condition where further treatment
would not only be futile but painful, life-sustaining
procedures must, apparently, be undertaken and con-
tinued.32
Mrs. O'Connor existed in this semi-conscious and incompetent con-
dition for an additional ten months, until finally passing away. 33
Mrs. O'Connor said that she would never want to be kept
alive on life support because she felt it was unnatural and monstrous.
The statements she made were informed by over twenty years of
working in a hospital. She made them known repeatedly to friends,
family, and co-workers and she did not waiver, in this regard, over
many years. It is respectfully submitted that if Mrs. O'Connor's
30 Id.
31 Id. at 616 (Hancock, J., concurring); Id. at 620 (Simons, J., dissenting).
32 O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 617 (Hancock, J., concurring).
33 Charles Green, Government Might Step Into Fray, Push 'Living Wills,' LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), Jan. 12, 1990, at A2.
2010] 681
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statements on this issue are not sufficient, then there is no way for
anyone to articulate his or her wishes regarding life support.
Eighty-year-old Mary Wohlford from Dyersville, Iowa, in re-
sponse to In re Schiavo,34 tried something drastic to make sure her
wishes were followed. She actually tattooed "Do Not Resuscitate"
on her chest due to her concerns about her final wishes not being
honored.3 5 There are questions as to whether even this type of in-
struction would be legally enforceable in New York.
III. LOWER COURTS DISTINGUISH O'CONNOR
Ten years after the O'Connor decision, the dissent's predic-
tion that the standard would prove unworkable or inhumane began to
come to fruition as lower courts scrambled to distinguish O'Connor.
In re Christopher3 6 was the first in a string of cases that began to
show that lower courts found the O'Connor decision unworkable.
Ms. Kushnir was a seventy-nine year old Russian immigrant,
who had Alzheimer's, was non-communicative, incontinent, bedrid-
den, devoid of all cognitive function, and constantly in pain.37
The Supreme Court, Queens County, permitted her son to
refuse a feeding tube for his mother after recalling only one statement
made by his mother.38 Ms. Kushnir made this one statement, approx-
imately ten years prior, when she had seen a television show about
Sunny Von Bulow in which Ms. Von Bulow was shown in a coma.39
The son stated to his mother, " '[i]t's good to be rich in this country,
Mom, because even in her condition, she still looks like a model.'
[Ms. Kushnir] replied, 'No, [even] if you was rich, I wouldn't want to
be in this condition, never.' "40
The court in In re Christopher, went to great lengths to distin-
guish the case from O'Connor. Its reasoning was that Ms. Kushnir
34 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the trial court's decision to
terminate Terri Schiavo's life support based on a petition by her husband to do so).
35 Ken Fuson, 80-year-old's Tattoo Spells Out Last Wishes Inked Instructions, SEATrLE
TIMES, May 17, 2006, at A2. See generally Marian Haglund Juhl, A Tattoo in Time,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 1997.
36 675 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1998).
1 Id. at 808.
3 Id. at 808-09.
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contemplated Ms. Von Bulow in a coma with a feeding tube, which
was similar to her current condition of no cognitive function. 4 1 The
court's desire to work around the O'Connor standard is evidenced by
the fact that the court credited the only statement Ms. Kushnir ever
made regarding being kept alive by artificial means. This recollec-
tion, according to the court, was so unusual "that it bears greater
weight than the numerous instances recalled by the family members
in the O'Connor case," and that Ms. Kushnir's wishes should be fol-
lowed, and life-support systems removed. 42 The court went on to cri-
ticize the fact that New York has no legislation on this issue to pro-
* * 43vide guidelines for patient, families, or medical personnel.
Later decisions, in the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, and various supreme courts, reflect the courts' agreement with
the O'Connor dissent; that the standard is unrealistic.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, stated, citing
O'Connor, that one's wishes might be honored if they "clearly ex-
press [one's] intentions, as might be reflected by her expectations,
personal choices, moral beliefs, religious convictions and the like."44
As such, this is a significantly lower standard than that set forth in
O'Connor.
The Supreme Court of Suffolk County has gone further, stat-
ing that
[w]hile the standards considered in [a previous case],
were . . . applied to a patient in an irreversible coma,
subsequent authority establishes that a patient with ir-
reversible brain damage, unable to attend to activities
of daily living, may, in a proper case, also be entitled
to have his or her wishes honored to withhold artificial
life-sustaining procedures . .. even where the person is
",45not in a coma ....
This decision is consistent with the best interest standard, discussed
41 Christopher, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
42 id.
43 Id. at 810.
4 Haymes v. Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 731 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (2d Dep't 2001) (citing
O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607).
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in Part IV(C), and included in two tiers of the FHCDA.
The Supreme Court of Nassau County, in a thorough discus-
sion regarding termination of life support, cited O'Connor as stand-
ing for the fact that the " 'clear and convincing' evidence standard
must be satisfied in order to terminate artificial life supports for a
now-incompetent patient based upon that patient's previously ex-
pressed wishes, while competent, not to be kept alive by artificial
means," and that the evidence must be unequivocal.46 This certainly
is not the high standard set by O'Connor. It is further evidence that
the courts are trying to work around a standard that is unworkable
and unfeasible.
Courts have been distinguishing O'Connor or widening the
scope of what satisfies the O'Connor standard for more than a dec-
ade. 47 However, that does not resolve the underlying problem. Low-
er courts becoming more permissive does not mean that the New
York Court of Appeals will see things in the same light. Even Judge
Wachtler, who wrote the O'Connor decision, said that the O'Connor
ruling has been applied more strictly than intended.48 It is clear that
O'Connor is not workable, and major action by the New York Court
of Appeals or the Legislature is required to remedy this issue.
46 In re Gianelli, 834 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2007).
47 See In re Gianelli, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (reciting a lesser standard than required in
O'Connor, such that the patient only need to expressed their wish not to have artificial life
support while competent); In re Chantel R., 791 N.Y.S.2d 324, 327 (Surr. Ct New York
County 2004) (distinguishing O'Connor, a case involving a previously competent person,
from cases involving those who are mentally retarded); Balich, 2003 WL 21649907, at *3
(reciting a list of criteria in which artificial life support measure might be withheld, based on
O'Connor); In re AB, N.Y.S. 2d 256, 260 (Sup. Ct. New York County 2003) (distinguishing
O'Connor, a case involving an adult, from cases involving minors); Haymes, 731 N.Y.S.2d
215, 217 (indicating that if one makes a living will that expressly states one's wishes regard-
ing artificial life support, which also reflects one's decision based on their "expectations,
personal choices, moral beliefs, religious convictions, and the like," their wishes might be
upheld in court); Christopher, 675 N.Y.S.2d. at 809 (distinguishing on the grounds that the
patient did not have a gag reflex problem as Mrs. O'Connor did).
48 Belkin, supra note 26, at Al.
684 [Vol. 26
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IV. ISSUES WITH SURROGATE DECISION MAKING
A. States' Rights to Preserve Life vs. Individuals'
Rights to Refuse Treatment
New York State courts have held that competent individuals
have a right to refuse medical treatment, including life support meas-
ures.49
There are four state interests that must be balanced against the
patient's right to refuse treatments (self-determination); of those four
interests, the right of the state to preserve life is the right most impli-
cated in this discussion.o In New York, as a result of Court of Ap-
peals decisions, a competent patient has a right to forgo even mini-
mally invasive life-sustaining measures. 51  Incompetent patients,
however, no longer have the ability or right to make these decisions,
except to the extent that others know of, and are required to follow,
any previous wishes the patient had expressed. 52 This means that un-
less you tell others what your wishes are in a "clear and convincing"
manner, your wishes will not be followed. In New York, the
O'Connor standard defines what "clear and convincing" entails,
which is an impractical and unachievable standard. Very few, if any,
New York residents will satisfy this standard and have their final
wishes carried out.
B. Current Attitudes Toward Surrogate Decision
Making
Two of the most common arguments against terminating life
49 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE:
DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 25 (1992) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. See In re
M.B., 813 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (2006) ("Under New York common law, a competent adult
generally has the right to make health care decisions, including the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment."); Chantel, 791 N.Y.S.2d at 326 ("[T]he right to refuse unwanted med-
ical treatment is a constitutionally protected liberty interest . . . ." (citing Cruzan v. Missouri
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)); Christopher, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 808 ("New York,
as well at most states, recognizes the common-law right of a competent person to decline
medical treatment.").
50 TASK FORCE, supra note 49, at 25.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 28.
2010] 685
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support for a person who did not put their wishes in writing are: (1)
how can one know what the person would have wanted; and (2) how
does one know the surrogate decision maker will not impute their
own wishes on what they think the patient would want? These argu-
ments are used time and time again to stall any progress on reforming
life-support termination laws for incompetent patients.
However, a 2006 study by The Pew Research Center for the
People & the Press uncovered some surprising results, which support
surrogate decision-making. Seventy-four percent of the people inter-
viewed believed that, when a terminally ill patient is no longer able to
communicate their wishes, a close family member should be able to
make a decision as to whether to continue medical treatments.53
However, only fifty-three percent would stop their own treatment
from an incurable disease or if suffering great physical pain, and thir-
ty-four percent would want their doctor to do everything possible to
save them if they were suffering from an incurable disease or suffer-
ing great physical pain.54 Of the respondents polled, African Ameri-
cans, youths aged eighteen to twenty-nine, and those with a high
school or lesser degree were the groups that, statistically, felt that
everything should be done to preserve life.ss These results demon-
strate that, while about a third of people would do everything they
could to prolong life, and a simple majority would choose to termi-
nate life support, an overwhelming majority support a person's right
to choose for themselves.
Of those who responded that they had discussed their end-of-
life decisions with someone, sixty-nine percent had discussed with a
spouse, fifty-seven percent with a mother, and forty-eight percent
with a father. 56 Seventy-four percent of the respondents wanted a
close family member to be the one to determine their treatment if
5 THE PEw RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR RIGHT TO DIE (2006), http://people-press.org/report/266/strong-public-support-for-right-
to-die [hereinafter PEw RESEARCH CENTER].
54 id
5 Id.; see also Peter Steinfels, Beliefs': In the Right-to-Die Debate, the Public Reveals
Strong Views, but also the Ability to Make Distinctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at A12
(stating that, generally, African Americans "may suspect that talk of ending treatment and
allowing patients to die will work especially to their disadvantage").
56 PEw RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 53 (demonstrating that these results are up eighteen
percent with spouses, fourteen percent with mothers, and twenty percent with fathers accord-
ing to answers given in 1990).
686 [Vol. 26
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they were unable to communicate their wishes.17
These results are significant because they indicate that at least
sixty percent of respondents rely on oral statements to either a spouse
or parent to have their wishes carried out. The study directly contra-
dicts the first argument against surrogate decision making that no one
could know what an individual on life support would want. With al-
most seventy percent of the population stating their wishes-orally or
in writing-it is obvious that people are communicating their wishes.
These results directly implicate O'Connor and its unachievable stan-
dard. If most people are discussing their wishes with their immediate
family members, there is something seriously wrong with New York
jurisprudence that permits a significant amount of the population's
direct wishes not to be honored.
Interestingly, the Pew Research Center also asked respondents
if Congress was correct to get involved in the case of Terri Schiavo.
Terri Schiavo was a twenty-seven year old woman who was in a per-
sistent vegetative state, whose husband wanted to disconnect life
support, and whose parents opposed it.5 8 Terri's parents, and both
Florida and national politicians, got involved. The politicians came
back early from recesses, passed special laws-mostly deemed un-
constitutional-and even tried to switch jurisdiction from the state
courts to federal courts to intervene in the case. 59 The case went all
the way to the United States Supreme Court, but review was denied.60
The study found that only seventeen percent of the respondents felt
that Congress did the right thing in involving themselves in Schiavo's
case. 6 1  An extraordinary eighty-three percent felt that politicians
should stay out of these personal decisions. This further indicates
that New York needs legislation that would allow for the minimiza-
tion of state and court interference with these deeply personal deci-
sions.
Another study published in 2007, analyzing data from a 2004
5 Id. (demonstrating that these results are approximately the same from the seventy-one
percent reported in 1990).
58 Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177-78.
59 John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (7n)signficance, 35 STETSON L. REV. 101, 108-10
(2005).
60 Schiavo v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
61 PEw RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 53 (noting that this is down from a survey con-
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Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, shows that ninety percent of married
persons discussed their end-of-life wishes with a spouse, while over
sixty-six percent of parents discussed their wishes with a child.62
These results affirm the idea that many people are discussing their
end of life decisions with loved ones, again, implicating the
O'Connor predicament in New York.
A second study published in 2008, again analyzing data from
the 2004 Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, studied surrogate accuracy
in the end-of-life decision making given two scenarios: the first,
comparing surrogate accuracy when the patient was "mentally intact,
but in severe and constant physical pain;" second, comparing surro-
gate accuracy when the patient "had minimal physical pain, but had
limited ability to speak, walk, or recognize others."63
The study found that in the first scenario-pain, but no mental
impairment-surrogates were accurate sixty-two percent of the time
in determining what their spouse would have wanted. 4 However,
significantly, the study found that in the second scenario-minimal
pain, but deficient mental and physical ability-surrogates were ac-
curate seventy-seven percent of the time. Surprisingly, having a
health care proxy and/or a living will was not "a significant predictor
of surrogate accuracy." 66 Additionally, the accuracy rates remained
the same independent of the decisions the surrogate-spouse would
62 Deborah Carr & Dmitry Khodyakov, End-of-Life Health Care Planning Among Young-
Old Adults: An Assessment ofPsychosocial Influences, 62B J. GERONTOLOGY S135, S137
(2007) (reflecting higher percentages than those in the Pew study). One of the limitations to
the 2007 study is that it concentrated more generally on white Americans, at least high
school educated adults, who have a higher percentage of discussing and implementing end-
of-life directives than younger, African American, or less than high school educated individ-
uals. Id. at S138, S140.
63 Sara M. Moorman & Deborah Carr, Spouses' Effectiveness as End-of-Life Health Care
Surrogates: Accuracy, Uncertainty, and Errors of Overtreatment or Undertreatment, 48
GERONTOLOGIST 811, 813 (2008).
6 Id. at 815. Finding that in this first scenario, surrogates were uncertain of their decision
between eleven and sixteen percent of the time and made errors in decisions that resulted in
the slight over treating or under treating of their spouse between eleven and twenty-two per-
cent of the time. Id. at 811. This twenty-two percent in slight over/under treatment is statis-
tically relevant as the surrogate is still generally making the decisions the principle would.
65 Id. The surrogates, in this second scenario were also uncertain of their decision eleven
percent of the time, and made errors in decision that would result in slight over or under
treatment of their spouse twelve percent of the time. Id. This twelve percent is also statisti-
cally relevant as the surrogate is still generally making the decision the principle would.
Moorman & Carr, supra note 63, at 811.
66 Id. at 816.
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have made for themselves.67
These results are significant in contradicting the second ar-
gument most frequently used against surrogate decision making: how
do we know the surrogates will not substitute their wishes for those
of the patient. In this scenario, which the FHCDA would address, in-
competence due to mental and physical deficiencies with little chance
of recovery, spouses made the correct or slight over or under treat-
ment choices for their incompetent spouse eighty-five percent of the
time-even when it differed from what they would choose for them-
selves.
These study results indicate several conclusions: first, people
are overwhelmingly willing to let people decide for themselves what
their end-of-life decisions should be, even if it differs with their own
wishes; second, people are almost evenly split between whether they
want everything possible done to preserve life, or whether they would
choose to stop treatment, further indicating the need to protect
peoples wishes; third, people are significantly more likely to discuss
their end-of-life wishes than they are to complete a living will; fourth,
those who did prepare a living will usually did so only in response to
being involved in making these decisions for a friend or relative;
fifth, it is not appropriate for the government to insert itself into very
personal end-of-life decisions; and lastly, surrogates who are spouses
make correct decisions regarding their spouse-patient's wishes eigh-
ty-five percent of the time in the case where a patient was mentally
and physically incapacitated. These results reinforce the suitability of
incorporating the substituted judgment standard for surrogate deci-
sion making that is incorporated into the proposed New York legisla-
tion.
C. Ethical Considerations in Surrogate Decision
Making
There are two standards of surrogate decision-making that are
the most widely accepted: the substituted judgment standard and the
best interest standard. There are praises and criticisms of each type
of substituted decision making. The FHCDA incorporates both stan-
dards.




Tuthill: Want to Terminate Life Support? Not in New York: Time to Give New
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAWREVIEW
patients' wishes in furtherance of the right to self-determination. It
takes into account information known from and about the patient, in-
cluding personal preferences, values, morals, and religious ideolo-
gies.68 A major criticism of the substituted judgment standard is that
no one can really know what a presently incompetent patient would
have wanted in their current situation, and that in certain situations
this standard offers no guidance. 69  The above referenced studies
seem to indicate that, at least, spousal surrogates pretty accurately de-
cide as their patient-spouses would have decided. In situations where
there is no guidance available, decisions should be made under the
best interest standard.
The best interest standard "serves primarily to protect and
promote the well-being of vulnerable patients." 70  The standard
should consider the patient's pain level, his or her treatment goals,
the prolongation of life verses the burdens of living with the amount
of pain and suffering the patient is experiencing, and the ability to ei-
ther preserve the current functional level of the patient, or the ability
to restore function to the patient.7 1 The surrogate should ask if the
treatment would unnecessarily prolong the dying process for the pa-
tient.72 Those who criticize surrogate decision making often state
that," '[n]o matter how burdened it may be, human life remains inhe-
rently a good of the person. Thus, remaining alive is never rightly
regarded as a burden.' "7 Still, others view life as always intrinsically
good, but as it relates to other living activities, "our capacity for con-
sciousness, thought, and human interactions," not just a "biological
function." 74 The best interest standard implies that a patient's best
interests inherently involve "the value of the patient's life for the pa-
tient, not the value of the patient's life to others."
A separate study showed that sixty-one percent of respondents
"would have allowed their surrogates at least some leeway 'to over-
68 TASK FORCE, supra note 49, at 54.
69 id.
70 Id. at 55.
71 Id. at 55-56.
72 Id..
7 TASK FORCE, supra note 49, at 57 (quoting William E. May et al., Feeding and Hydrat-
ing the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 205,
208 (1987) (internal citation omitted)).
74 Id. at 57-58.
7 Id. at 59.
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ride their advance directive if overriding were in their best inter-
est.' ,76 The study also showed that eighty-seven percent of respon-
dents wanted surrogate decision makers to consider their quality of
life in making a decision on their behalf.n The result of this study
bolsters the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study and the Pew Research
Center studies, both of which indicate that if the surrogate takes the
incompetent's best interest and quality of life into account, the surro-
gate's decisions would be acceptable almost ninety percent of the
time. This greatly supports the FHCDA since it would permit surro-
gate decision making for life support decisions, especially since the
second and third tiers incorporate the best interest standard.
D. Technological Advances
Since the decision in O'Connor, medical technology has ad-
vanced at an astonishing rate. These technologies "are now able to
sustain life using aggressive treatments despite severe debilitating ill-
ness. In many cases, technological advances have obvious benefits
.... However, for those with irreversible disabilities, aggressive
measures can postpone death and merely serve to prolong suffering
and extend the dying process."7 8  The O'Connor decision failed to
take medical advances into consideration in developing the standard.
There are a variety of medical technologies that can be used
to extend life. Percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy ("PEG") feed-
ing tubes for artificial hydration and nutrition, ventilators, and ma-
chines for kidney dialysis are most often referred to in referencing
life support. There is, however, a trend to overuse these technologies
at the end of one's life. Dr. Kenneth Fisher, a physician at the Mich-
igan State University and at Henry Ford Hospital, feels that
"[p]atients who have no chance of survival are subjected to unneces-
sary tests, treatments, and procedures." 79 This further supports a need
76 Hana Osman & Terry M. Perlin, Patient Self-Determination and the Artificial Prolon-
gation of Life, 19 HEALTH & Soc. WORK 245 (1994) (quoting A. Sehgal et al., How Strictly
do Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directives Followed?, 267 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 59,
63 (1992)).
7 Mary Daisy Boehm, Sticking to Advance Directives, 17 SECOND OPINION 108, 108
(1992).
78 D. W. Molloy et al., Technology and Educating Seniors About Advance Directives, 26
EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 357, 357-58 (2000).
7 Linda S. Mah, Health-Care Priorities Lambasted, TIMES (N.J.), June 23, 2008, at Bl.
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to change the O'Connor standard, so people are not simply kept alive
because technology can do so.
A research study by the Dartmouth Atlas Project shows that
twenty-seven percent of Medicare costs are spent in the final year of
a patient's life.80 This supports doctors and patients contentions that
patients are left in limbo, somewhere between life and death, exposed
to unnecessary and futile tests and treatments. 8 ' This is true in New
York, as most patients who have stated their wishes, but not in a way
sufficient to meet the O'Connor standard, are kept in limbo for sig-
nificant periods of time. This, not only, goes against their wishes, but
is a significant and unnecessary waste of valuable resources.
Overuse of life-sustaining medical technology is found when
looking at the history of the PEG.82 In 1979, PEGs were first used by
Dr. Michael Gauderer in the University Hospitals of Cleveland as
"emergency care for younger patients."8 It was intended for use
over a few months and designed to get a person past their current cri-
sis, not for those suffering from an irreversible illness.84 PEGs have
not been found to prolong the lives of the terminally ill, but their use
is still very widespread.
These issues with advanced technologies only emphasize the
need for a mechanism to carry out the wishes of those who have de-
cided that if there is no hope for their recovery from an incompetent
state, they do not wish to prolong a life which, to them, has no quality
that makes it worth living. Furthermore, why should people be sub-
jected to medical procedures that they do not want, who have stated
80 Julie Appleby, Debate Surrounds End-of-Life Expenses, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 2006, at
Bl.
81 Jeffrey Zaslow, Moving On: Waiting for the End: When Loved Ones Are Lost in Limbo,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2007, at DI; see also Mah, supra note 79, at BI (stating that the lives
of patients are extended because of medical technologies and treatments often thought to be
unnecessary considering the circumstances).
82 Mark Fritz, Last Rights: How Simple Device Set Off a Fight Over Elderly Care; In-
vented for Younger Patients, Feeding Tube Now Figures in End-of-Life Debate; A Missed
Box on a Living Will, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2005, at Al.
83 Id.
8 Id. See also Scott Thomas, Feeding the Dying-Medical or Moral Decision? While
Moral Debate Continues to Rage After the Terri Schiavo Case, There's New Scientific Evi-
dence that Forced Feeding is Not Beneficial, BUFF. NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 19, 2006, at HI ("The
PEG tube was developed for use with patients who need to get over the hump-those with a
reversible illness, such as a severe infection, or those who are recovering from surgery.
Soon doctors were using feeding tubes for patients with more permanent disabilities . . .
85 Fritz, supra note 82, at Al; see also Thomas, supra note 84, at Hl.
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to friends and family that they do not want, and made these state-
ments with the expectation that these requests will be fulfilled. The
overuse of technology in New York is partly attributable to
O'Connor. Since most people cannot meet the O'Connor standard to
have life support terminated, they are kept on life support for an ex-
tended time until they pass.
V. CURRENT NEW YORK LAW AND A MODEL FROM NEW
JERSEY
A. Health Care Proxies in New York
Approximately two years after the O'Connor decision, and
only six days after the Supreme Court handed down the decision in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,86 the New York Legisla-
ture passed Article 29-C, an amendment to the Public Health Law. *
Article 29-C provides for Health Care Agents and Proxies to make
certain medical decisions for an incapacitated patient. A Health Care
Proxy, however, cannot make decisions regarding artificial nutrition
or hydration unless he or she knows the wishes of the patient. Health
Care Proxy forms are most effective when used in conjunction with a
living will.
However, there is a gaping hole in proxy planning in New
York State. Article 29-C does not overcome the O'Connor standard,
which requires that people contemplate their exact situation and
treatment over time. In other words, they must reflect on that deci-
sion over time and come to a firm and settled commitment with re-
spect to their decision prior to an actual occurrence and communicate
that to their proxy for the proxy to be able to act on their life support
wishes.
" 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) ("State[s] may apply a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a per-
son diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state.").
87 Jill Hollander, Health Care Proxies: New York's Attempt to Resolve to the Right to Die,
57 BROOK. L. REv. 145, 147 (1991); Marina Martino, Note, Deciding for Others: New York
Law and the Rights of Incompetent Persons to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Medi-
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B. Living Wills in New York
In New York, living wills are only relevant for probative val-
ue in a hearing to determine if the O'Connor standard has been met.
Thus, even a living will does not guarantee that one's wishes will be
followed. 88 Without a living will, family members of an incapaci-
tated individual are only permitted to make decisions about whether
cardiopulmonary resuscitation can be used to sustain life. A Health
Care Proxy, in combination with a living will, gives incapacitated pa-
tients the best chance that their wishes will be fulfilled; however,
again, these are both written instruments. There is no solution for
those who have not put anything in writing, but have relied only on
oral statements made to family and friends.
C. MOLST in New York
Governor Paterson signed a bill into law in July of 2008
called Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment ("MOLST"). 89
While this bill does not replace living wills or health care proxies, it
does allow "[s]eriously ill patients with advanced chronic illness and
frailty, after talking to their doctor, to complete the MOLST form
about the kind of care they want at the end of their life." 90 This law
seems to fill the gap in the law in New York for making sure one's
final wishes are carried out, but this form, like a living will, must be
completed while a patient is competent to make decisions about their
care known to their physician, it does not help if there is some sudden
occurrence in a previously healthy person that renders them incompe-
tent.91 MOLST also is required to be signed by a physician, not the
patient. 92  As a result, the MOLST form is just another stop-gap
measure to do what the New York Legislature failed to do, pass legis-
lation that will implement a more reasonable standard than
O'Connor.
88 See Hollander, supra note 87, at 161.




92 James T. Mulder, Hospitals Adopt Patient-Care Form: Onondaga County Facilities
Use Uniform Record for Life-Sustaining Treatment Orders, POST STANDARD (N.Y.), Mar.
26, 2005, at A5.
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D. Potential Solutions to New York's Problem: In re
Conroy
New York would benefit greatly from adopting the FHCDA,
which was modeled on New Jersey's three-tier decision-making
model. New Jersey's model has been in place since 1985 when In re
Conroy93 was decided, and which the New Jersey legislature later co-
dified.
In re Conroy involved an eighty-four year old woman who
was bedridden and had a host of physical and mental diseases from
which she would not be able to recover, but who could interact, in
limited ways, with her environment.94 Her nephew, who was also her
guardian, said that his aunt feared and avoided doctors; in one in-
stance, when she had pneumonia, he could not get her to allow a doc-
tor into the house, and in another instance, when she was taken to an
emergency room, she would not sign herself in. 95 Ms. Conroy was
also Roman Catholic, and the church she attended had a document
that discussed "weighing of the burdens and the benefits to the pa-
tient of remaining alive with the aid of extraordinary life-sustaining
medical treatment." 96 This was considered strong evidence that Ms.
Conroy's decision would have been reflected upon and informed by
the dictates of her religion. The court determined that Ms. Conroy
would never regain significant cognitive function, and permitted her
feeding tube to be removed.97
Ms. Conroy passed away during the appeals process, but both
the appellate court and supreme court felt the case was "capable of
repetition but would evade review."98 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey, unlike the New York courts or legislature, which have largely
remained silent, felt something needed to be done. The court decided
there needed to be guidelines and procedures developed to help
determine the circumstances under which life-
sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn
from an elderly nursing-home resident who is suffer-
9 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
94 Id. at 1216-17.
9 Id. at 1218.
96 Id.
9 Id. at 1218-19.
98 Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1219.
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ing from serious and permanent mental and physical
impairments, who will probably die within approx-
imately one year even with the treatment, and who,
though formerly competent, is now incompetent to
make decisions about her life-sustaining treatment and
is unlikely to regain such competence. 99
As a result, the court developed a three-tiered system to set
out how to decide whether to withhold or remove life-sustaining
treatment. Only one of the tiers needs to be satisfied, with prefe-
rences in the following order: subjective test, limited-objective test,
and pure-objective test. The subjective test is similar, if not slightly
broader, than a standard clear and convincing evidence test, which
incorporates the best evidence of the patient's wishes. The limited-
objective standard is used if the evidence is substantial, but not quite
enough to meet a standard clear and convincing test, but is then
looked at and combined with a weighing of the patient's condition.
The pure-objective standard strictly takes into account the patient's
condition. This model is best suited to effectuate a patient's wishes,
or if not known, at least balances the burdens of the patient's life, in-
cluding pain, against the benefits the patient gets from life.
The first test, the subjective test, states that "life-sustaining
treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient
when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused the
treatment under the circumstances involved." 00 This test is broadly
construed to encompass a wide variety of evidence that would consti-
tute the patient's intent. It will be evaluated for its probative value in
"remoteness, consistency, and thoughtfulness of the prior statements
or actions and the maturity of the person at the time of the statement
or acts,"101 as well as the specificity of the statements, and "medical
evidence bearing on the patient's condition, treatment, and progno-
sis."102 The subjective test is very similar to New York's old "clear
and convincing test," which is used in many states.103 It is the best
99 Id. at 1219-20.
'" Id. at 1229.
'o' Id. at 1230.
102 Id. at 1230-31.
103 Petersen, supra note 6 (explaining that a clear and convincing standard is used in: Ala-
bama, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey (this is
the subjective test), New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Wisconsin (although Wisconsin's clear and
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test to assure that either living wills or direct evidence of repeated,
detailed oral statements by an individual would be considered and
fulfilled. A majority of people would most likely fall into this tier.
The second tier, the limited-objective standard, allows the
withholding or removal of life-sustaining treatment "when there is
some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the
treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the
burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh
the benefits of that life for him."l 04 This test examines all the pa-
tient's medical diagnosis, prognosis, and pain levels and duration.105
The test attempts to determine whether the "pain and suffering out-
weigh the benefits that the patient is experiencing. The medical evi-
dence should make it clear that the treatment would merely prolong
the patient's suffering and not provide him with any net benefit."1 06
This test also requires evidence that the patient would have consented
to withdraw or withhold treatment.107 Any of the evidence that would
have been considered under the subjective test can be considered,
even if the evidence, on its own, would not have been enough to ful-
fill the subjective test.'08 The limited-objective standard would allow
for circumstantial evidence of what the individual would want to be
considered and followed. It is a blend of circumstantial evidence and
the best interest test. This tier would be the second most used tier of
the legislation.
The third tier, the pure-objective standard, would be satisfied
if the
net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment
should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that
the patient derives from life. Further, the recurring,
unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with
the treatment should be such that the effect of admi-
nistering life-sustaining treatment would be inhu-
mane.109
convincing standard is actually used as a best interest standard)).





109 Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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This test does not require any of the evidence that would have been
considered under the subjective test, or any evidence that might have
satisfied the subjective prong of the limited-objective standard."o
This tier is strictly the substituted judgment standard. It is a balanc-
ing test of the benefits and the burdens of the patient's life, in deter-
mining what would be a humane and dignified decision for the pa-
tient. This test would be the least used of any of the tiers, but it is
still relevant, because of documented research showing that spouses
are excellent surrogate decision makers for their incompetent spous-
es.
The court goes on to clearly state that none of the tests should
be used to permit withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment from a "patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept
alive in spite of any pain that he might experience.""' Additionally,
the court stated that if the evidence is "equivocal, it is best to err ...
in favor of preserving life."ll 2 The State of New Jersey codified this
ruling in 1992."
This three-tier decision making model has been in use, with
no major detractors, for twenty-three years. It is an excellent model
for New York to have used to develop its own legislation. It incorpo-
rates both the substituted judgment standard and the best interest
standard between the three decision levels. It has an exception to
protect the rights of people who have indicated they want physicians
to do everything possible to preserve their lives. It gives a flexible,
workable, achievable standard that is reasonable to implement.
VI. NEW YORK'S PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. The Task Force on Life and the Law and Proposed
Legislation
In 1992, the Task Force on Life and the Law was formed as a
state task force to look into this gaping hole in New York legislation,
11 Id.
'" Id.
"2 Id. at 1233.
"13 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-63, 26:2H-67, 26:2H-69 (West 2008).
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and to propose legislation that took into consideration: "expertise
from many disciplines, and . .. opinion and belief about bioethics is-
sues in New York [S]tate."I1 4 The Task Force proposed the legisla-
tion in 1992, and New York has had Assembly and/or Senate legisla-
tion based on the Task Force recommendations since at least 1996
that would implement a decision making model on when termination
of life support for incompetent individuals, who have not made a
writing, would be permissible. There are two separate pieces of leg-
islation, one in the Senate, and one in the Assembly, both of which
are currently the same. 115 The FHCDA is very similar to the Conroy
three-tiered system, and is supported by over forty-eight different or-
ganizations, including religious, medical, and civic associations, as
well as the New York State Bar Association.' 16
The FHCDA provides a list of potential health care decision
making surrogates if the patient is found incompetent in case the pa-
tient has not already selected one; it outlines who is not eligible to be
a surrogate; and it also has a provision for people who do not have a
surrogate who is willing or able to act as a surrogate." 7 The FHCDA
sets standards for decision making." 8  It allows for surrogates to
make decisions on a tier-system, similar to the New Jersey statute; it
allows for decisions based on what are known patient wishes.119 If
the patient's wishes are not known to a certain enough standard, the
wishes that are known are looked at in conjunction with what are in
the best interests of the patient.120  If a patient's wishes are not
known, or cannot be discovered, then treatment can be withheld or
withdrawn if the
114 Vincent Buzard, New Yorkers in Need ofHealth Care Decision Act, ALB. TIMES UNION
(N.Y.), June 4, 2006, at C6.
"s S.B. 3164, 233rd Leg., Sess. (N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994];
Assemb. B. 7729, 233rd Leg., Sess. (N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2994]. Please note, each bill has it's own bill number assigned to it; however, the bills are
currently identical and, if passed will become N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2994. For ease of
discussing individual sections of the bill, the citations will refer to section 2994 as this will
allow for quick reference, because the bills are numbered internally with that prospective law
number. However, when looking for the bill itself, the appropriate Senate bill number and
Assembly bill number should be used.
116 Buzard, supra note 114, at C6; see also NYSBA Urges Legislature, supra note 6.
117 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2944-d(1)-(2), supra note 115.
" Id. at § 2994-d(4), supra note 115.
"9 Id. at § 2994-d(4)(a)(i), supra note 115.
120 Id. at § 2994-d(4)(a)(ii), supra note 115.
2010]1 699
25
Tuthill: Want to Terminate Life Support? Not in New York: Time to Give New
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAW REVIEW
treatment would be an extraordinary burden to the pa-
tient and . .. the patient has an illness or injury which
can be expected to cause death within six months,
whether or not treatment is provided; or . .. the patient
is permanently unconscious; or . . . treatment would
involve such pain, suffering or other burden that it
would reasonably be deemed inhumane or extraordi-
narily burdensome under the circumstances and the
patient has an irreversible or incurable condition.12 1
The FHCDA also has provisions if the patient is in a residential fa-
cility for health care or in a hospital, which requires an added layer of
protection by requiring a review of the decision by an ethics review
committee of the facility.122
Additionally, the FHCDA sets standards for patient protection
after a surrogate has made a decision. The physician, after recording
the decision as to whether to withhold or withdraw life support, has
the option of following the decision; or objecting to the decision and
allowing the patient to be treated by another physician, or a referral to
the ethics committee can be made. 123 It also has instructions for the
physician to refer the case to the ethics review board if people, who
have a designated relationship with the patient, disagree with the
choice of surrogate or the decision of the surrogate.124 It allows for
policies on how to implement these decisions, as well as how to re-
121 Id. at § 2994-d(5)(a)(i)-(ii), supra note 115. Even though this tier would rarely be
used, and maybe because it would rarely be used, it could be eliminated if there are insur-
mountable ethical concerns. Argument over this tier is not reason enough to keep this ex-
tremely important legislation from passing. Some commentators have pointed out that
"[p]ain can usually be controlled through medications" and concern that the pain the patient
is experiencing could be due to substandard care. David M. English, Comment Defining the
Right to Die, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 259 (1993). See also Herbert Keating, A
Simple Statement that can Avert so Much Hardship, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Nov. 26,
2006, at H4 (stating that a doctor in Connecticut has also taken it upon himself to create a
questionnaire to give every one of his patients at their annual physical in which they can ei-
ther fill out at that time or take home and mail back-if they are inclined-which would in-
form the doctor as to the patient's wishes for end-of-life decisions if they are not competent
to make them for herself); see also Interview by Neal Conan with Michael Schiavo, at NPR
Talk of the Nation, (Mar. 30, 2006) (stating that a hospital in South Dakota asked patients if,
when they go into the hospital, they have a living will to avert confusion and because they
feel that respecting patient wishes are important).
122 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2944-d(5)(b)-(c), supra note 115.
123 Id. at § 2994-f(1), supra note 115.
124 Id. at § 2994-f(2), supra note 115.
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view them, including review by an ethics committee. 125 Additionally,
it allows privately owned hospitals and individual providers to make
a conscience objection and adopt policies on how to handle these pa-
tients.126
The FHCDA is a reasonable, workable, and attainable stan-
dard that allows the final wishes of patients to be carried out, whether
that is to have life support measures undertaken, or not, or something
in between. It allows for a humane death, not a drawn out, withering
existence. It balances a state's interest in preserving life with a pa-
tient's right of self determination by incorporating, not just the substi-
tuted judgment standard, but also the best interest standard. It also
has built in protections for the patient to be sure that a patient's wish-
es are followed, and that the patient is not subject to impure motives.
This is excellent legislation that would allow a patient to have their
final wishes followed, regardless of what those wishes are.
B. The Road Ahead in the New York Senate
The New York Assembly has amended, revised, and passed
their version of the FHCDA. It passed 137 to 5 and was delivered to
the Senate on January 20, 2010.127 The Senate has now adopted the
bill passed by the Assembly in it's entirety and the bill has set for a
meeting before the Senate Committee on Health, and has been re-
ferred to the Senate Code Committee.128
There are two major impediments to passing the FHCDA in
the Senate: first, is the lack of wording which indicates what should
be considered regarding a pregnant comatose woman,129 and second,
the inclusion of same-sex partners in the list of surrogates, which im-
plicates gay rights issues. 130
125 Id. at § 2994-k, § 2994-m, supra note 115.
126 Id. at § 2994-n, supra note 115.
127 New York State Assembly Summary (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.assembly.state.ny.
us/leg/?bn=A07729.
128 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2994, supra note 115.
129 See Hollie J. Paine, Symposium: "Caring for the Dying: Reexamining Our Approach"
Notes, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 371, n.85 (1999) ("[T]he Conference did oppose the
bill because . . . it did not offer 'higher decision-making standards' for . . . 'treatment of
pregnant patient[s] to the detriment of the unborn child." (citing Letter from John M. Kerry,
New York State Catholic Conference, to Hon. Joseph Lentol, Chairpoerson, Assembly codes
Comm. and Comm. Members (June 23, 1997)).
130 End-of-Life Logjam, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2007, at 411.
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The lobbying arm of The New York State Catholic Confe-
rence ("The Catholic Conference") is the leading opponent to the bill
due to the wording regarding treatment of women who are pregnant
at the time the decision is made regarding life support.13 1 Initially,
The Catholic Conference opposed prior versions of the bill because it
did not require a surrogate decision maker to take into consideration
the impact of the decision on the fetus. 132 The wording was changed
to require the surrogate to take into consideration "the impact of the
treatment decisions on the fetus"-including the "course and out-
come" the treatment decision would have on the pregnancy.'3 3 This
wording was also carefully fashioned so that it would not create
"special rights for the fetus," and would be acceptable to pro-choice
groups.134 This caused The Catholic Conference to withdraw their
opposition to the bill, but they did not support it either. 35
An additional change, made at the same time the change was
made to the wording regarding pregnant patients, was to remove do-
mestic partners from the list of surrogate decision makers.136 This
created an entire new group of opponents who wanted gay partners
included on the surrogate list and who wanted the language regarding
pregnant patients changed back to the original wording. 3 7
As a result, the current bill was changed back to the original
language, causing The Catholic Conference to again oppose the
bill.' However, Assemblyman Richard Gottfried, sponsor of the
Assembly bill, feels that the bill "would require anyone making a de-
cision for [a pregnant patient] to consider the woman's 'moral values
and wishes.' "l39 It remains to be seen whether The Catholic Confe-
rence lobby is strong enough to defeat this important legislation. Be-
cause, the Catholic Conference does not actively object to the word-
ing of the bill, the FHCDA should return to this language to ensure
131 Henry L. Davis, Life and Death-Who Should Make the Choice?: Controversial Bill
Gets Support From Families Asking That the Decision be Put in Their Hands, BUFF. NEWS





136 Davis, supra note 129, at Al.
37 Id
138 id.
139 Harvy Lipman, Giving Family a Role in Health Care Bill Would Provide Relatives
More Say in Caring for Very Ill, ALBANY TIMES UNION (N.Y.), June 26, 1995, at B2.
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the bills passage.
As for same sex couples, the current Assembly bill, which has
been adopted by the Senate, includes same sex partners in the list of
surrogate decision makers at the same level of a spouse, only behind
a guardian.140 There is some hope that a problem will not exist in the
Senate regarding this issue, as the Senate backed a bill that was
signed by Governor Pataki, which gives domestic partners-same sex
or opposite sex-the right to make decisions about how to dispose of
their partners remains. 141 This seems to indicate a trend in favor of
domestic partners.
As for same sex partners, twenty-eight states and the District
of Columbia list a patient's partner in the list of acceptable surrogates
to make medical decisions for someone who is incapacitated. 14 2 Of
those, twenty states allow a partner to make the decisions only as
"one who has exhibited special care and concern" or "close friend"
with a list of up to seven people who come before the partner in the
surrogate list.143 Unfortunately, this article cannot take on same-sex
discrimination issues, although it seems that our notions of equality
should allow same-sex partners-who, in most states, do not have the
right to marry and, therefore, cannot legally be assigned the term
140 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2944-a(7)(c), supra note 115. Defines a Domestic Partner
as being:
[D]ependent or mutually interdependent on the other person for support,
as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances indicating a mutual in-
tent to be domestic partners including but not limited to: common own-
ership or joint leasing of real or personal property; common household-
ing, shared income or shared expenses; children in common; signs of
intent to marry or become domestic partners ....
Id.
141 Davis, supra note 129, at Al.
142 Human Rights Campaign, Healthcare Laws: State by State,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/7935.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (demonstrating that the fol-
lowing states maintain a patient's partner in the list of acceptable surrogates: Alaska, Arizo-
na, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virgin-
ia, Wisconsin, Wyoming).
143 Id.; see also Gay & Lesbian Medical Association, Visitation Guidelines for Hospitals,
http://www.hrc.org/ documents/GLMA_-_SampleVisitationPolicy.pdf (recommending
that hospitals use the definition of family promulgated by the Joint Commission: "[A]ny per-
son(s) who plays a significant role in an individual's life. This may include a person(s) not
legally related to the individual . . . . This includes both spouses and same-sex domestic
partners").
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"spouse," which in turn denies them the approximately 1300 rights to
which married couples are entitled'"-to act as a surrogate, just as
opposite-sex, legal spouses are allowed to act as surrogates. Inclu-
sion of same sex partners, as surrogates equal to that of a spouse,
needs to be included, particularly in light of the defeat of Governor
Paterson's same sex marriage proposal.
VII. CONCLUSION
There must be a mechanism by which New Yorkers can en-
sure that their final wishes will be honored. The O'Connor decision
effectively took that decision away from most. Technological ad-
vances now allow people to be kept alive, but incompetent or un-
conscious for a very long time. This not only goes against their
wishes, it wastes valuable resources on treatments that the patients
themselves do not want. Whether to terminate life support, or not, is
too important, and too personal of a decision to rely on chance that
one's wishes will be followed.
New York State has had legislation pending for almost seven-
teen years that incorporates not only an evidentiary standard for mak-
ing a decision, but which also incorporates the substituted judgment
and best interest standards, which are two of the best standards for
surrogate decision making.
It is evident that many people discuss their final wishes orally
with loved ones, but not enough are memorializing their wishes in
writing. There is significant evidence that surrogate decision makers
do, in fact, make choices consistent with what the patient would have
chosen. As a result, there can be little concern regarding the accuracy
of surrogate decisions, because those closest to the patient often have
knowledge from the patient themselves about the end-of-life care
they want, and surrogates will follow the patient's wishes even if it is
different than what they would want for themselves. Furthermore,
surveys have shown that people are willing to give their decision
makers some leeway in making decisions different from the patient's
own if the decision maker takes into account the patients best inter-
144 Larry McShane, Gov. Paterson Introduces Legislation to Legalize Gay Marriage in
New York, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2009/
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ests and quality of life in making the decision. Moreover, people
generally support the right to make one's own decisions, and not have
politicians or the courts make their decisions for them.
The legal procedure involved with going to court to obtain the
right to make decisions for a loved one is "lengthy, expensive and
emotionally draining" according to former New York Court of Ap-
peals Judge Hugh Jones.14 5 Julianne Chase Delio, who watched her
thirty-three year old husband, Danny, who became brain-dead after a
problem during surgery, waste away while fighting in court to have
his life support removed based on his oral wishes, agrees: "Court is
the last place a family belongs when they are facing their darkest
hours."l 46
There is room for disagreement. There is a clear need to pro-
tect patients from people with impure motives. There is a need to
protect a person's wishes if that person wishes to be kept alive at all
costs. There is a need to protect a person's wishes if that person does
not want any medical intervention. There is also a need to protect a
person's wishes if that person wants medical intervention in certain
circumstances. So, should not New Yorkers have a law that will al-
low the wishes of all people to be honored? Let the people of New
York state decide what their final health care wishes and values are.
The FHCDA should be passed, and soon. This would give New
Yorkers legislation that will allow their wishes to be carried out, one
way or the other.
VIII. AFTERWORD
Since the completion of this Comment, the New York State
Senate, by a vote of fifty-five to three, has passed the Family Health
Care Decisions Act, and Governor Paterson has signed it into law.147
However, the structure of the law has changed from the initial pro-
posal and the Conroy model.
Surrogates are permitted to make general medical decisions
145 Deborah Barfield, State Right-to-Die Legislation Debated, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1996, at
A19.
146 id.
147 New York State Senate Votes (Feb. 24, 2010), http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/
bill/S3164B. See also New York State Governor David A. Paterson, Newsroom Press Re-
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for the patient under one of two standards: 1) "in accordance with the
patient's wishes," 48 similar to the subjective test under Conroy; or 2)
"if the patient's wishes are not reasonably known and cannot with
reasonable diligence be ascertained, in accordance with the patient's
best interests," this is the best interest standard for surrogate decision
making. 149 Using either one of these standards, the surrogate must
also use a form of the substituted judgment standard for surrogate de-
cision making by taking into account the "values of the patient, in-
cluding the patient's religious and moral beliefs . . ..
However, when surrogates are making decisions regarding
withdrawing or withholding life support, in addition to the subjective
or best interest tests and the substituted judgment standard, this deci-
sion has additional conditions that must be met.' If the treatment
"would be an extraordinary burden to the patient" and two indepen-
dent physicians agree that "to a reasonable degree of medical certain-
ty and in accord with accepted medical standards" the patient is ex-
pected to die within six months regardless of whether they are treated
or not for their injury or illness,' 5 2 or if the patient is found to be
permanently unconscious, life support can be withheld or with-
drawn.153 Alternatively, the decision could also be made if two inde-
pendent physicians agree that the burdens of the treatment would be
extraordinary or inhumane and if it is determined that the patient is
suffering from is "an irreversible or incurable condition." 54
In regards to who can be a surrogate the list includes same-
sex partners, at the same level as spouses. 1s Same-sex partners
would fall under the category of domestic partners, which the law de-
fines, in part, as "mutually interdependent on the other person for
support, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances indicating a
mutual intent to be domestic partners .... 156 The statute includes a
non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining wheth-
er people are domestic partners, which would cover most same-sex
148 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(4)(a)(i), supra note 115.
149 Id. at § 2994-d(4)(a)(ii), supra note 115.
Iso Id at § 2994-d(4)(b), supra note 115.
1' Id at § 2994-d(5), supra note 115.
152 Id. at § 2994-d(5)(a)(i)(A), supra note 115.
M N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(5)(a)(i)(B), supra note 115.
154 Id at § 2994-d(5)(a)(ii), supra note 115.
155 Id. at § 2994-d(1)(b), supra note 115.
156 Id. at § 2994-a(7)(c), supra note 115.
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couples who are, at the present time, not permitted to marry. 57
In terms of surrogate decision making for pregnant women,
the language requiring the surrogate to take into consideration the ef-
fect of the decision on the outcome of the pregnancy is not included.
But, even without the language, and despite continued opposition
from The Catholic Conference, The New York State Right to Life
Committee supports the bill, because it is unfathomable "that some-
one making a decision about whether or not to protect the life of a
mom has not considered the baby." 5 8
Twenty-two years after the decision in O'Connor, and eigh-
teen years after initial legislative proposals to counter the effect of
O'Connor, New York finally has legislation that fills a big gap in
New York end-of-life decision making that allows every New Yorker
to have their final wished carried out, no matter what those wishes
are.
Id. at § 2994-a(7)(c), supra note 115.
158 Anemona Hartocollis, Law Dictates Who Decides on Care for the Incapable, N.Y.
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